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MARBURY AND SIMMENTHAL:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
DECENTRALIZED JUDICIAL REVIEW BY
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
by Peter W. Schroth*
Judicial review is a topic that has fascinated Americans for at least
180 years. Our early, and still unusual, position that the courts in gen-
eral have the authority to determine the constitutionality of laws has
influenced constitutional thinking in most of the world. After consider-
ation, however, most of the world has declined to accept our view. In
evaluating this rejection of one of our most cherished institutions, we
must distinguish the extent to which it corresponds to differences be-
tween their systems and ours that suggest or require different ap-
proaches to judicial review from the extent to which we and they are
seeing the same problem differently. The former offers insights into the
nature of our system and the fundamental choices involved in continu-
ing, say, the common-law tradition as opposed to a shift toward the
civil-law approach. The latter, however, more directly challenges us to
justify or to alter our different solutions to similar problems.
The present essay focuses not so much on the general issue of judi-
cial review as on the more specific question of which judges ought to
participate in constitutional development. Since American lawyers
usually do not seem to be aware even that this is a question, I begin
with a general discussion of centralized review (in which a particular
court, rather than judges in general, has the authority to decide consti-
tutional questions) and decentralized review (the system used in the
United States) (Part I). I turn next to a discussion of a 1978 decision of
the Court of Justice of the European Community, Italian Finance Ad-
ministration v. Simmenthal S.p.A.,' in which it was held that all judges
Copyright © 1979 by Peter W. Schroth.
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1. Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629, [19781 3 C.M.L.R. 263, 2 COM. MKT. RPTR. (CCH)
8476 (March 9, 1978), sometimes referred to below as Simmenthal I. Compare note 59
infra. Other comments on the decision are cited in notes 73 & 74 infra.
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of the member states must apply Community law2 directly, disregard-
ing conflicting national laws. The case is of particular interest because
the Italian Constitutional Court has forbidden precisely what the Court
of Justice now requires3 (Part II). In response to the discussion of con-
stitutional changes by judges provoked by the Simmenthal decision,
and also because the connection to a brilliant new inter-disciplinary
book' is too fascinating to ignore, I pause to reject the extremes of posi-
tivism and determinism that they imply (Part III). Finally, I suggest
that there should be a shift in our approach to the problem of judicial
review on the basis of comparative study, namely that whether it
should exist in the United States is no longer worthy of serious discus-
sion; that the enduring question how it ought to be done can be seen
from higher ground than how a court or an individual judge should
behave; and that among the questions deserving further study in our
own system are which judges should bear more or less of the responsi-
bility for various aspects of constitutional change and what qualifica-
tions these particular judges should have for their task (Part IV). Lest I
excite unfulfilled expectations, I hasten to add that this comment does
little to answer this last class of questions; rather its function is to
demonstrate that they are worthwhile lines of inquiry despite our ne-
glect of them to date.
2. "Community law" as the term is used here refers not only to the treaties but also to
Community-level legislation, known as regulations and directives. Thus the Court of Jus-
tice's unwritten "supremacy clause" (see notes 96 & 99 infra and accompanying text) is
roughly the functional equivalent of U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
3. The Italian Constitutional Court crystallized its approach in two cases and an order:
Sentenza 22 ottobre 1975, n.232 (SocietA I.C.I.C. c. Ministero Commercio Esterio), reprinted
in 58 RIvIsTA Di DIRrro INTERNAZIONALE 766 (1975); Sentenza 28 luglio 1976, n.205 (Am-
ministrazione delle Finanze c. Ditta Fratelli Grassi), reprinted in 59 RivisTA Di DiRrnro
INTERNAZIONALE 809 (1976); Ordinanza 28 luglio 1976, n.206 (De Rossi c. Prefetto de
Roma), reprintedin 59 RIVISTA DI DIRrrro INTERNAZIONALE 814 (1976). See also Sentenza
29 dicembre 1977, n.163 (Societa Unil-it c. Ministero delle Finanze), 101 FoRO IT. I, I
(1978). For a sharply critical view of this line of cases, see Cappelletti, Giustizia Costituzion.
ale Soprannazionale. II Controllo Giudiziario delle Leggi e la Giurisdizione delle Libertib a
Livello Internazionale, 38 RIVlSTA DI DIRITrO PROCESSUALE 1, 15-20 (1978). Other com-
mentary includes Monaco, Sulla Recente Giurisprudenza Costituzionale e Comunitaria in
Tema diRapportifra Diritto Comunitarlo e Diritto Interno, 18 RIvSTA Di DIRITTo EUROPEO
287 (1978); Pappalardo, Italienische Rechtsprechung zum Vorrang des Gemeinschaftsrechts,
EUROPARECHT 1978, 160. These cases are also discussed in many of the essays cited in notes
73 & 74 infra.
4. D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979) [here-
inafter cited as HOFSTADTER].
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I. CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED REVIEW
A. Decentralized Review in the United States
The theory of judicial review of legislation expounded by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison' has become such a central part of
our legal Weltanschauung that Americans have difficulty imagining
how a constitution could have meaning without it:
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be
considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see
only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitu-
tions. . . . It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is ex-
pressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in
reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real
omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their pow-
ers within narrow limits ...
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest im-
provement on political institutions-a written constitution-would of it-
self be sufficient, in America where written constitutions have been
viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction.
6
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803). In Marbury, the Court held an act of Congress unconsti-
tutional, whereas in Simmenthal the statute in question was passed by the Italian parliament
(the counterpart of a state legislature, if the European Community is the counterpart of our
federation) rather than by the Council of the European Community (the counterpart, more
or less, of Congress). In a sense, then, a case such as Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810), might seem more analogous. As will become clear, however, my interest is not so
much in the precise holding of either case as in the underlying approach to the role of
judges. Marbury exemplifies, as well as any decision of the Marshall Court, the unarticu-
lated presumption that what one court can do, all can do, except that higher courts can
revise the decisions of lower courts. Indeed, the presumption was sometimes more or less
expressed, as in the first and second sentences of the quotation in the text accompanying
note 17 infra, but it is nevertheless Marbury that remains the leading case.
6. 5 U.S. at 70. Chief Justice Marshall continues, "But the peculiar expressions of the
Constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favor of its rejection." Id
In summary, these are: 1) that the judicial power extends to "all Cases . . . arising under
this Constitution .... " U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, "and if [the judges] can open it at all, what
part of it are they forbidden to obey?" 5 U.S. at 70; 2) that laws and actions directly conflict-
ing with clear provisions of the Constitution, such as duties on articles exported from states,
U.S. Co sT. art. I, § 9, cl. 5, bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, U.S. CoNrsT. art. I, § 9,
cl. 3, and conviction of treason on the testimony of fewer than two witnesses or confession
out of court, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cannot be tolerated by the courts; 3) that judges must
take an oath to support the Constitution, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3; and 4) "that in declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the land," U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2, "the constitution itself
is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally but those only which shall
be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank." 5 U.S. at 72.
With respect, the first point is a combination of shameless question begging (whether test-
ing statutes for constitutionality is "judicial" is the very question being considered) and an
1979]
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This passage may be analyzed, however, as making two quite differ-
ent points, demanding separate evaluation. The first is that some con-
trol of the constitutionality of legislation must exist outside the
legislature itself if the constitution's status as higher law is to be mean-
ingful. The trend in Western countries is strongly toward increasing
recognition of this point,7 although very few have carried it as far as
ha the United States.'
The second point, with which this comment is primarily concerned,
is that the determination of constitutionality is the responsibility of the
judges, and specifically of every judge in every case in which the issue
arises. This view has few adherents, and has led to even fewer invali-
dations of statutes by lower courts, outside the countries of the common
law.9 Its claim to logical inevitability was destroyed by Hans Kelsen
long ago:
empty rhetorical question. The second point avoids the real question, namely who is to
interpret the Constitution, by citing only examples in which no interpretation is necessary.
(But see, e.g., text following notes 27 & 28 infra.) The third point is all but dishonest if the
question is whether judges or other officials should interpret the document, since the clause
applies equally to all three branches: "The Senators and Representatives . . . . and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution. . . ." U.S. CONST. art, VI,
cl. 3. (And ought we to note, in connection with the next point, that "judicial Officers" are
mentioned last?) The fourth point begins with the extraordinarily weak argument that the
Constitution mentions itself first in a list, and continues with the irrelevancy that laws passed
by Congress prevail over other laws, such as state laws, only if made in pursuance of the
Constitution. The issue, after all, is not conflicts between state and federal laws, but rather
conflicts between federal laws and the Federal Constitution.
The preceding paragraph is only an indulgence that many other scholars (who, like me,
tried to let on that they were smarter than the great Chief Justice) have allowed themselves.
See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-14 (1962). Its point, however, is
that Marshall's real argument for judicial review of Congressional legislation is the one
quoted in the text, not any of the makeweights that conclude the opinion. The key words in
the quoted paragraphs, I think, are "in practice," "in reality," "practical and real." Chief
Justice Marshall is justly revered not for the sterile beauty of his logic, but rather for forging
a strong, functional system out of whatever materials were available.
7. This is true even in countries that reject judicial review as a matter of principle. For
example: "Before 1958, the legislature had in fact gained almost unlimited power. . . . Be-
cause the courts could not declare a statute passed by Parliament unconstitutional, constitu-
tional limits on legislative power were purely formal." R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW 25 (M.
Kindred trans. 1972).
8. For general, comparative studies of judicial review, see M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971) [hereinafter cited as CAPPELLETTI]; MAX-
PLANCK-INSTITUT FOR AUSL;NDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT,
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART: LANDERBERICHTE UND RECHTS-
VERGLEICHUNG (1962) [hereinafter cited as VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT]. See a/so M.
CAPPELLETTI & D. TALLON (eds.), FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL
LITIGATION (1973) [hereinafter cited as FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES].
9. See notes 24-25 infra and accompanying text.
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Even if one would assume-which it is not all that clear that one may-
that a norm contrary to the higher norm leads to no duty of obedience,
this only leads to the difficult question: who is to examine and decide the
conformity or nonconformity of the norm to be executed.
This problem usually appears in the literature only with regard to the
question whether and to what extent a government official is under a duty
to obey an unlawful order, and whether and to what extent he has the
right to examine the legality of the order. The question must be stated
much more generally, however, for a satisfactory solution to the specific
application can be found only in the context of the general problem. The
latter relates not only to government officials, but generally to all organs
by which the laws are executed, and especially to the individual subject
(although he is not an "organ"' in the narrower sense), who, with respect
to the norm he must observe, which is to say execute, is fundamentally in
the same situation as the "organ." In the same way the "organ," with
respect to the norm it must execute, which is to say observe, can be con-
sidered only as a subject. . . . Thus the problem exists not only with re-
spect to the particular norm of orders given to government officials by
their superiors, but rather with respect to every specific and general norm
and at every level of execution: constitution, statute, regulation, adminis-
trative act and judicial decision, general and individual legal act. 10
Not every citizen, however, can determine the validity of norms in a
10. H. KELSEN, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 287-88 (1925) [hereinafter cited as KELSEN]
(my translation). The general issue is discussed at 287-301, with a careful distinction be-
tween the right to examine the legality of a norm [Plifungsrecht] and the right to decide on
its legality [Entscheidungsrechtl. See also note 11 infra. Most of this discussion is unfortu-
nately omitted from H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A. Wedberg trans.
1945) [hereinafter cited as GENERAL THEORY], but what does appear in the latter seems fully
consistent with the 1925 version, if dramatically condensed. See, e.g., id at 153-62. There
are also a few passages that seem relevant to the general inquiry of this article:
If the legal order does not contain any explicit rule to the contrary, there is a presump-
tion that every law-applying organ has this power of refusing to apply unconstitutional
laws. Since the organs are entrusted with the task of applying "laws," they naturally
have to investigate whether a rule proposed for application really has the nature of a
law. Only a restriction of this power is in need of explicit provision. Although the
power of a law-applying organ to examine the constitutionality of laws to be applied to
concrete cases, and to refuse the application of a law recognized by it as unconstitu-
tional, can never be completely eliminated, it can be restricted in different degrees. The
law-applying organ can, for instance, be entitled to investigate only whether the norm
which has to be applied to a concrete case was actually passed by the legislative organ;
or whether the norm has been created by a legislative or executive organ competent to
issue general legal norms. If that is found to be the case, the law-applying organ may
have no further right to dispute the constitutionality of the norm.
Id. at 268. See also Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: 4 Comparative Study of the Aus-
trian and the American Constitution, 4 J. POLITICS 183 (1942). An interesting recent discus-
sion built on this part of Kelsen's thought appears in L. PRAKKE, TOETSING IN HET
PUBLIEKRECHT 73-82 and passim (1972).
In the last sentence of the quotation, "legal act" stands for Rechtsgeschiaft, the equivalent
of actejuridique, negozio giuridico, etc. This is one of those outrageously abstract terms so
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way that binds others; indeed, it is an interesting philosophical question
whether an individual citizen's determination binds even the one who
makes it. I It is commonplace that Marshall's point about the constitu-
tional requirement of a judge's oath to support the constitution 2 fails
to distinguish judges from all other government officials; 3 Kelsen only
makes it look sillier by pointing out that everyone has a duty to support
the constitution. Marshall should have discussed the advantages in let-
ting judges make the binding determination,'4 as opposed, for example,
to the first branch to deal with a point, or to the branch most closely
associated with the subject matter.
We continue to discuss whether judges are best suited to make the
binding determination of the United States,' 5 but we are not in the
dear to Legal Science, with no common-law equivalent. Kelsen's translator makes it "legal
transaction (juristic act)," producing the following explanation:
The legal transaction is an act by which the individuals authorized by the legal order
regulate certain relations legally. It is a law-creating act, for it produces legal duties and
rights of the parties who enter the transaction. But at the same time it is an act of law-
application, and thus it both creates and applies law. The parties make use of general
norms which render legal transactions possible. By entering a legal transaction, they
apply these general legal norms. By giving individuals the possibility of regulating their
mutual relations through legal transactions, the legal order grants individuals a certain
legal autonomy. It is in the law-creating function of the legal transaction that the so-
called "private autonomy" of the parties manifests itself. By a legal transaction, indi-
vidual and sometimes even general norms are created regulating the mutual behavior of
the parties.
GENERAL THEORY, supra, at 137. The concept is broad enough to include, for example,
contracts, gifts, marriages and wills (but not torts). For further discussion, see M. CAPPEL-
LETTI, J. MERRYMAN & J. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 177-79 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM]; H. LEHMANN & H. HUBNER, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES
BEJRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 140-51 (16th ed. 1966).
11. For Kelsen, for example, this depends on the distinction between Prffungsrecht and
Entscheidungsrecht mentioned at the beginning of note 10 supra, and discussed at length by
him in the source cited there. The point is sometimes telegraphed in the English version,
however, as in GENERAL THEORY, supra note 10, at 154:
Just as the existence of a fact to which a legal norm attaches certain consequences can
be ascertained only by an organ in a certain procedure (both determined by the legal
order), the question whether a lower norm corresponds to a higher norm can be decided
only by an organ in a certain procedure (both determined by the legal order). The
opinion of any other individual is legally irrelevant.
As Kelsen carefully admits, however, legal relevance is not the only relevance. In lieu of
elaboration in a comment already overburdened with footnotes, I invoke the name of
Thoreau.
12. 5 U.S. at 71.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. Subject of course, to the amendment procedure. See also part III infra, notes 84-107
infra and accompanying text.
15. For example, the whole premise of R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as BERGER],
is that judges have no business deviating from the Framers' intentions in any way. I take the
book to be a scholarly demonstration that this premise is nonsense, since it leads logically to
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habit of distinguishing from this the question whether all judges should
share the power. This is easily explained: Marbury v. Madison, in
which the point made no difference, was the only decision of the Mar-
shall Court invalidating an act of Congress. The frequent issue, then as
now, was the constitutionality of state laws, which were struck down in
thirteen cases by the same Court. 6 There it was necessary to decide
where supremacy would reside, and the Court made a clearly reasoned
claim:
It is ... argued, that no great public mischief can result from a con-
struction which shall limit the appellate power of the United States to
cases in their own courts ... because state judges are bound by an oath
to support the constitution of the United States, and must be presumed to
be men of learning and integrity .... [A]dmitting that the judges of the
state courts are, and always will be, of as much learning, integrity, and
wisdom, as those of the courts of the United States, (which we very cheer-
fully admit,) it does not aid the argument. It is manifest that the constitu-
tion has . . . presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire)
that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests,
might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or con-
trol, the regular administration of justice....
This is not all. A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with the
most sincere respect for state tribunals, might induce the grant of appel-
late power over their decisions. That motive is the importance, and even
necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States,
such conclusions as that school desegregation can only be accomplished by constitutional
amendment. "If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adop-
tion it means today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their
time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation." Home Build-
ing & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 US. 398, 442-43 (1934). Even if it appeared that Berger
thought Congress could enforce school desegregation under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, I
think his book would be a sufficient refutation of his premise. But, although the matter is
not as clear as one would wish, I understand the arguments made in the introduction, BER-
GER at 10-19, to imply that Congress could not desegregate schools without a further amend-
ment. This reading also seems compelled by R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME
COURT 355-367 (1969). For an exhaustive discussion of GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, with
Berger's even more exhaustive responses, see Symposium, 6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 403-635
(1979).
16. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); Sturges v. Crown-
inshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Farmers and Mechanics' Bank v. Smith, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 131 (1821); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Osborn v. President of the Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824);
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Weston v. City Council of Charleston,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829). See also Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
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upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution. Judges of equal
learning and integrity, in different states, might differently interpret a stat-
ute, or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itself: If
there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant
judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties,
and the constitution of the United States would be different in different
states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction,
obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that would
attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable .... 17
The need for uniformity is the strongest argument for a single, final
authority, and much of the discussion of types of judicial review
reduces to the question of the extent to which they will result in uni-
formity. In the United States the system only tends toward uniformity
because most constitutional cases never reach the Supreme Court. For
example, while orders of the lower federal courts are binding on the
state courts in particular cases, neither the state courts nor the lower
federal courts can bind the other for the future on questions of federal
constitutional law. 18
B. Centralized Review in the Member States of the European
Community
In the countries of the civil-law tradition, there are three standard
objections to the American arguments for judicial review. First, the
entire concept of stare decisis 19 is usually rejected, and often vehe-
mently.2 ° Second, the civil-law judges are not necessarily distinguished
in "learning. . . and wisdom," since judging is an occupation one be-
17. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 303, 345-48 (1816) (Story, J.) (emphasis
in original).
18. See, e.g., United States exrel Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971).
19. One method of achieving a tendency toward uniformity is to give a single court exclu-
sive jurisdiction of constitutional issues. An alternative method is to require that prior deci-
sions, even of other courts, be followed when the same issue recurs.
20. Precedent-justice is not only illogical but pernicious, because it interferes with the
wiser conclusion of a later judge through the "prejudice" of the earlier judge and serves
the comfort of the indolent judge. Its sway marks a lack of legal culture. (Precedent-
justice rules where there is no scientific knowledge or theory to enrich and guide legal
practice and legislation-it exists where legal practice teaches legal practice, as in Eng-
land. Judges lacking independence favor it, since it is comfortable and saves effort,
work and personal responsibility.) A mark of Rome's high legal culture is its systematic
prohibition.
W. ENGELMANN, DIE WIEDERGEBURT DER RECHTSKULTUR IN ITALIEN 29 (1938), translated
and quoted in J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 100 (1968). Dawson adds, "This
statement is no doubt extreme and seems to us perverse; surely few modern Germans would
subscribe to it." Id Ideas not far removed from it are commonplace in the civil-law tradi-
tion, however. For further discussion, see J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW:
[Vol. 12
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gins almost immediately after law school.2 ' Finally, there is a strong
tradition in many countries, based on Montesquieu and the French
Revolution, that a proper separation of powers forbids judges to inter-
fere with the functions-such as enacting statutes-of the other
branches of government.22
As the American idea of a written constitution has come to be ac-
cepted by almost every country in the world, those that treat their con-
stitutions as enforceable,23 and yet adhere to civil-law principles, have
had to consider how the two can be reconciled. The American idea
that every judge is a constitutional judge has been carefully examined,
and occasionally adopted. By and large, however, the countries that
have adopted the American system either are not really in the civil-law
tradition, or adopted decentralized review and later abolished it.24 And
WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 551-628 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as MERRYMAN & CLARK].
On the other hand, form and practical effect are not necessarily the same, as when:
the institution of cassazione in part substitutes for stare decisis as a means of ensuring
uniformity in interpretation and application of the law. While even important decisions
of the full bench of the [Italian] Court of Cassation are legally binding only on the
lower court that receives the case on remand, they have great influence. In part this
follows from the prestige of the Court and in part from the fact that it closely follows its
own precedents. Since any party has the constitutional right to recourse in cassation, a
judge who does not follow the Court's holding in a similar case risks reversal.
Merryman & Vigoriti, When Courts Collide: Constitution and Cassation in Italy, 15 AM. J.
COMP. L. 665, 669 (1967).
21. A good selection of material on this general subject appears in MERRYMAN & CLARK,
supra note 20, at 397-516.
22. For example, ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 75-81, makes these three
points, adding that "the framers of the [1948] Constitution also took into account. . . that
the incumbent Italian judges had been selected, trained, and promoted under the fascist
system and were unlikely to interpret the Constitution in the progressive spirit intended by
the framers." Id at 76-77.
23. Some constitutions, such as those of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of
China, are treated as lists of accomplishments and aspirations rather than of standards. In
appropriate cases, the constitution will even be modified to conform to the law. See, e.g., J.
HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 54 (3d ed. 1977); N. REICH
& H.-C. REICHEL, EINFOHRUNG IN DAS SOZIALISTISCHE RECHT 111-13 (1975); Tsien, Les
Modifcations de la Constitution Chinoise, 30 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARt
557 (1978); CAPPELLETTI, supra note 8, at 11 n.29.
It might be noted that some provisions of Western constitutions are also treated as aspira-
tions rather than rules. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (agreeing that the guaranty clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, is
nonjusticiable); ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 58-59. Although provisions such
as FRENCH CONST. art. 54 and article 228 of the EEC treaty seem to call for revising the
constitution or treaty to conform-in these cases to international agreements-this has not
happened in practice.
24. For example, some of the countries whose approaches most resemble our system of
decentralized judicial review are Australia, Canada, India, Japan and Norway; even the last
two of these are only at the fringes of the civil-law tradition. Germany in the Weimar period
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several of the countries considered to follow the American plan despite
loose ties to the civil-law tradition can count few or no decisions actu-
ally holding statutes invalid.2"
It was Kelsen himself who provided the alternative, in proposals that
were included in the Austrian Constitution of 1920.26 While ordinary
judges were forbidden to question the validity of statutes, a special con-
stitutional court could give an authoritative ruling. Unlike the Ameri-
can system, in which questions of constitutionality may be raised only
in the course of ordinary litigation, and never abstractly, in Kelsen's
constitution they could only be raised abstractly, by a special proceed-
ing, and never in the course of ordinary litigation.
The French Constitution of 1958 provides for a limited system of
constitutional review somewhat similar to the 1920 Austrian ap-
proach.27 Today in both France and Austria ordinary judges must ap-
and Italy from 1948 to 1956 recognized decentralized judicial review, but they have now
changed to the centralized system described in the text below. For a general summary with
references, see CAPPELLETTI, supra note 8, at 47-51. For recent developments in Japan, see
Higuchi, Evolution Rkente du Contrble de la Constltutionnalit' sous la Constitution Japonalse
de 1946, 31 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARI 21 (1979).
The statement in R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD To-
DAY 101 (2d ed. 1978), that "[i]n Sweden, Denmark and Norway no control is exercised in
fact, even though the doctrine recognizes the theoretical right of the courts to do so on occa-
sion. No example of the courts having done so can be cited" is clearly wrong at least for
Norway. Cases from 1909, 1918, 1923, 1927, 1930 and more recent years, in all of which
Norwegian legislation was held unconstitutional, are mentioned by Castberg,
Perfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Norwegen und Dinemark, in VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT,
supra note 8, at 417.
The situation in Latin America is too complex for ready summary, although we may say
that in most countries some form ofjudicial review exists, that for the most part it has some
influence, but that it nowhere rises to the level of importance it has in, say, Italy or West
Germany. See generally R. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO (1971); Rosenn, Judicial
Review in Latin America, 35 OHIO ST. LJ. 785 (1974).
25. This is true of Sweden and Denmark, but less so than previously of Japan. See note
24 supra.
26. The "Oktoberverfassung," officially Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz vom 1. Oktober 1920,
BGBI. Nr. 1. It was significantly amended in 1929, BGB1. Nr. 1 (1930), and re-enacted
after World War II. For an extensive discussion, see Melichar, Die
erfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Osterreich, in VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT, supra note 8,
at 439. See also CAPPELLETTI, supra note 8, at 71-74.
27. This and several subsequent notes deal simultaneously with judicial review and the
supremacy, as a matter of national law, of Community law.
French constitutional adjudication is a three-ring circus, whose nature can quickly be
grasped from M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25-72
(1979). The French Cour de cassation has succeeded in giving supremacy to Community
law, ultimately without reference to the constitution. See von Kempis c. Geldof, [1976] D.S.
Jur. 33, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 152. See also Administration des Douanes c. Socirt6 "Caf6s
Jacques Vabre" et S.A.R.L. J. Weigel et Cie, [1975] D.S. Jur. 497, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 336.
The Conseil d'Etat, however, continues to be more reluctant. See Simon & Dowrick,
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ply even those laws they consider unconstitutional, and in both
countries certain political organs may raise the question of constitu-
tionality in a special court. The Austrian Constitution was modified in
1929 to allow the highest-but only the highest-civil, criminal, and
administrative courts access to the Constitutional Court in actual
cases.28 In France, however, even these highest judges must in theory
apply statutes they consider unconstitutional, without so much as the
right to refer the question to the Constitutional Council.
Later versions of centralized judicial review are found in the postwar
Constitutions of Italy29 and the Federal Republic of Germany.3" The
Italian Corte Costituzionale and the German Bundesverfassungsge-
Effect of EEC Directives in France: The Views of the Conseil d'Etat, 95 L.Q. REv. 376 (1979).
See also G. BEBR, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 219-22 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as BEBR]; E. BERGSTEN, COMMUNITY LAW IN THE FRENCH COURTS
(1973); Bebr, How Supreme Is Community Law in the National Courts?, 11 COM. MKT. L.
REv. 3, 11-17 (1974); Bermann, French Treaties and French Courts: Two Problems in
Supremacy, forthcoming in INT'L & COMP. L.Q. See generally Tunc, The Ffth Republic, the
Legislative Power, and Constitutional Review, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 335 (1960); Waline, The
Constitutional Council of the French Republic, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 483 (1963).
On the face of the 1958 Constitution, the only review of constitutionality is by the Conseil
constitutionnel under articles 41, 46, 61-63. For a more realistic appraisal, see text accompa-
nying notes 39-44 infra.
The Conseil constitutionnel, which during the 1970's had gotten into the habit of offering
obiter dicta that sharply limited some of its holdings, upheld direct elections to the European
Parliament while threatening to strike down any attempt to transfer sovereignty to the Com-
munity:
Whereas, although the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, confirmed by that of the 1958
Constitution, provides that, subject to the reserve of reciprocity, France accepts the lim-
itations of sovereignty necessary for the peace, no provision of a constitutional nature
authorises the transfer in whole or in part of national sovereignty to any international
organisation whatsoever.
Decision of the Constitutional Council of December 30, 1976, [19771 D.S. Jur. 201, 14 COM.
MKT. L. REv. 648 (1977). See Kovar & Simon, Some Reflections on the Decision of the
French Constitutonal Council of December 30, 1976, [1977] D.S. Jur. 201, 14 COM. MKT. L.
REv. 525 (1977). Possibly the reference to the Preamble also foreshadows reservations on
human rights grounds, comparable to those of the German and Italian courts. See notes 52
& 61 and accompanying text infra.
28. See note 26 supra.
29. ITALIAN CONST. arts. 134-137. See generally Cassandro, The Constitutional Court of
Italy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1959); ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra, note 10 at 75-81. See also
BEBR, supra note 27, at 223.
30. Articles 93, 94, 100. Aside from the possibility of conflict with basic rights, as to
which see note 55 and accompanying text infra, German courts apply Community Law
without regard to conflicting statutes. See, e.g., Re Fees for Examination of Imported Or-
anges, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 415 (German Fed. Sup. Admin. Ct. 1974). On the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, see generally D. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: A STUDY
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (1976) [hereinafter cited as KOMMERS]; 1 E.
COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 32-34, 41 (1968). See also BEBR, supra note 27, at 222-
23.
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richt, joined in the Federal Republic by the state constitutional courts,
are the only courts authorized to rule on the constitutionality of stat-
utes. Unlike Austria, both Italy and the Federal Republic authorize
any judge to invoke the jurisdiction of the constitutional court when-
ever a ruling on constitutionality seems necessary to a pending case.
The proceedings are stayed pending the result, which is then binding
not only on the parties but erga omnes. The sort of abstract review,
altogether divorced from any "case or controversy," that is available to
certain organs in Austria and France is also available on a sharply lim-
ited basis in Italy, and quite broadly-in some cases even to individual
citizens-in Germany.
Giving constitutional jurisdiction solely to a special court, rather
than to all courts or even to the highest of the regular and administra-
tive courts, allows judicial review to harmonize with a system in the
civil-law tradition. The three standard objections3' to the American
system of decentralized review are readily overcome by giving only this
court, which never performs the functions of an ordinary court, the
"non-judicial" powers to issue rulings binding in future cases and to
interfere with the legislative and executive branches, and by choosing
its members from the learned and politically-experienced rather than
from the recent graduates or from the career civil servants. The result
is two national courts in Europe whose constitutional case law is tend-
ing to show a striking resemblance to that of the United States Supreme
Court. In the case of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the introduction of
dissenting opinions in 1971 32 -an institution unique among continental
courts-and the utter rejection of the crippling French style of one-
sentence opinions have produced a body of case law that should be of
the highest interest to American constitutional scholars.
The various approaches to judicial review of legislation in the nine
member states of the European Community cannot be accurately de-
scribed as stations along a single line, but the effort to do so is neverthe-
less instructive. If the criterion is the degree of centralization of
whatever review exists, Italy is at one extreme with a single constitu-
tional court, and the Federal Republic of Germany is similar with one
constitutional court for each constitution (federal and state). Ireland33
3 1. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
32. See KOMMERS, supra note 30, at 194-98.
33. When it joined the Community, Ireland amended its constitution by adding article 29,
mentioning the Community expressly. Placing the treaties above even the constitution as
norms to be applied by the judges was not such an extreme step as the similar provision in
the Netherlands, however, since constitutional review was already granted to the two courts
mentioned in the text. See generally Casey, The Judicial Power Under Irish Constitutional
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assigns constitutional questions exclusively to two courts, the High
Court and the Supreme Court. At the other extreme are Denmark
34
and the United Kingdom,35 in which whatever power exists is shared
by judges generally, except for the power of higher courts to review the
decisions of lower courts.
Mention here of Britain, which, as asserted below, does have a sort of
judicial review of legislation, raises the question of how the threshold
determination whether any judicial review exists ought to be made.
Systems, that is, in which there really is no judicial review give all
judges the same non-power, and therefore might be considered a sort of
limiting case of decentralization. Although closer observation might
show that Belgium, 36 Luxembourg 37 and the Netherlands 3s have some
Law, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 305 (1975); J. TEMPLE LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND
COMMON LAW 48-51 (1966); Heuston, Personal Rights Under the Irish Constitution, 11 U.
BRIT. COL. L. REV. 294 (1977); O'Flaherty, Some Aspects of Law, the Constitution, and the
Courts in Ireland, 51 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 74 (1977); Temple Lang, Legal and Constitutional
Implicationsfor Ireland ofAdhesion to the EEC Treaty, 9 COM. MKT. L. REV. 167 (1972).
34. When it joined the Community, Denmark amended its constitution to allow delega-
tion of constitutional powers either by a five-sixths vote of the parliament or by a majority
vote of the parliament followed by a referendum. The latter was used to enact the ratifying
statute in 1972. See Warner, The Relationship Between European Community Law and the
National Laws of Member States, 93 L.Q. REv. 349, 360-61 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Warner]; Due & Gulmann, Constitutional Implications ofthe Danish Accession to the Euro-
pean Communities, 9 COM. MKT. L. REv. 256 (1972). On judicial review, see generally
Castberg, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Norwegen und Dainemark, in
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT, supra note 8, at 417.
35. So long as parliamentary omnipotence remains the British theory, the supremacy of
Community law rests on the rule of interpretation in section 2(4) of the European Commu-
nities Act 1972, and therefore could presumably be overridden by a subsequent statute. See
Warner, supra note 34, at 364-66; Forman, The European Communities Act 1972: The Gov-
ernment's Position on the Meaning and Effect ofIts Constitutional Provisions, 10 COM. MKT.
L. REV. 39 (1973); Winterton, The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Re-ex-
amined, 92 L.Q. REV. 591 (1976). See also note 46 infra.
36. It is now clear that Community law overrides Belgian law in Belgian courts. Minister
for Economic Affairs v. S.A. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse 'Le Ski', [1971] J.T. 460, [1971]
R.T.D.E. 494, [1972] C.M.L.R. 330 (May 27, 1971). For the standard view that there is and
should be no constitutional review in Belgium, see P. WIGNY, LA TROISIPME REVISION DE
LA CONSTITUTION 336-41 (1972); 1 P. WIGNY, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL: PRINCIPES ET
DROIT POSITIF 191-96 (1952). See also BEBR, supra note 27, at 224; Note, Conflicts Between
Treaties and Subsequently Enacted Statutes in Belgium,: Etat Belge v. S.A. "Fromagerie
Franco-Suisse Le Ski," 72 MICH. L. REV. 118 (1973).
37. Luxembourg amended its constitution upon joining the Community (article 37), but
in a way that left the supremacy of treaties uncertain. The decisions of the Conseil d'Etat,
however, leave no doubt that the treaties will be applied, even in case of a conflict with the
constitution itself. See Dieudonn& c. Administration des Contributions, Conseil d'Etat 28
juill. 1951, P.L.J. 15, 263; BEBR, supra note 27, at 218-19; P. PESCATORE, L'ORDRE
JURIDIQUE DES COMMUNAUTtiS EUROPPiENNES 247-48 (2d ed. 1973).
Although the Luxembourg courts do not pass on the constitutionality of statutes, some
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subtle form of judicial review even while denying its existence, for our
purposes their claims may be taken at face value.
Thus the only obviously complex case among the nine is post-1958
France. The new Constitutional Council, whose primary and perhaps
only intended function in reviewing legislation was to prevent the Par-
liament from passing laws in fields reserved for regulation,39 claimed a
somewhat broader role in the 1970's.40 Its powers nevertheless remain
sharply limited, in that it may rule only on the abstract question of the
constitutionality of a statute prior to promulgation. Even this limited
power is reconciled with the French theory of separation of powers
only by emphasizing that the Constitutional Council is not a court, and
never performs the judicial function of deciding a "case or contro-
versy."
The 1958 redistribution of law-making authority between the legisla-
tive and executive branches invites another level of discussion, how-
ever. Much of what is considered legislation in other countries, and
indeed was considered legislation in France until 1958, is now called
regulation in France.4' From a comparative point of view, perhaps it
should be thought of as legislation whatever the French choose to call
it. The Conseil d'Etat has long exercised a vigorous control over the
constitutionality of acts of the executive and administration.42 In 1953,
have suggested they should. Eg., P. MAJERUS, L'ETAT LUXEMBOURGEOIS 188-89 (1948). In
describing the existing system, Judge Pescatore straddles the issue magnificently:
In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg there is no constitutional'jursdiction. However, it
should be understood that any court is competent to decide a point of constitutional
law, if such a question arises in litigation before it and with which it is competent to
deal. However, by virtue of an enduring tradition, the Luxembourg courts refrain from
controlling the conformity of the ordinary laws with the Constitution if the constitution-
ality is in dispute. Thus the legislative [sic] has unrestricted sovereignty.
I INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L. L-48 (1973).
38. The Dutch have traditionally denied judges any power of constitutional review. See
Decision of January 30, 1963, Hoge Raad, N.J. 1963, p. 587. By amendments to the
Grondwet (articles 65, 66) an exception is made for international treaties, which the judici-
ary in general is to apply even in the face of conflicting constitutional provisions. Seegener-
all, van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and International Law, 47 Am. J. INT'L L.
537 (1953); BEBR, supra note 27, at 217-18.
The possibility of adopting judicial review of constitutionality has recently been thor-
oughly considered and rejected, with even the strongest proponents calling for centralized
review. See L. PRAKKE, TOETSING IN HET PUBLIEKRECHT (1972).
39. See, e.g., Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 189, 221
[hereinafter cited as Beardsley]; F. BATAILLER, LE CONSEIL D'ETAT: JUGE CONSTITUTION-
NEL 39 (1966) [hereinafter cited as BATAILLER].
40. See Beardsley, supra note 39; Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and Constitutional
Liberties in France, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 431 (1972); Haimbaugh, Was It France'r Marbury v.
Madison?, 35 OHIO ST. L. J. 910 (1974).
41. FRENCH CONST. arts. 34, 37.
42. The princ#pes gbnbraux du droit are drawn in part from the constitution and earlier
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this was somewhat decentralized by the creation of a nationwide net-
work of lower administrative courts.43 In 1959, the Conseil d'Etat
made it clear that it would treat all forms of regulation under the new
constitution, including regulation in areas formerly reserved for legisla-
tion, as within its jurisdiction and subject to constitutional review.
44
From this perspective, the reforms of the 1958 constitution may be seen
as having greatly increased both the substantive breadth and the decen-
tralization of French judicial review of legislation.
An alternative criterion is the extent to which judicial review affects
results. Of course, it is ordinarily impossible to say what effect an
unexercised power of review has on the legislature: that legislators will
themselves accept the responsibility for assuring that the constitution is
observed seems a priori as likely as that they will feel free to disregard
it. The Danish courts have long asserted the power to disregard uncon-
stitutional laws, but the Folketing, perhaps awed by this threat, has
failed to pass laws that the courts could find no basis for upholding.
Judicial review that always results in a finding of constitutionality may
seem meaningless to Americans, but it is not altogether so. In Belgium,
for example, it is generally acknowledged that the parliament has acted
unconstitutionally in some instances, and this is said to be preferable to
judicial interference.45
With the exception of Denmark, no country in the European Com-
munity admits the power of judges in general to examine the constitu-
tionality of laws. Five of them nevertheless have recognizably
influential judicial review of legislation. Judicial review is clearly most
important in Germany and Italy, where it has been assigned to special
courts, and within its domain the French Conseil d'Etat is fully as pres-
tigious as the Bundesverfassungsgericht or the Corte costituzionale.
The success in all three cases seems due in significant part to careful
separation from the ordinary courts.
The other two are Ireland and Britain, where the common law tradi-
tion assigns a rank to judges incompatible with passive acceptance of
unconstitutional statutes. In Britain, the judges continue to recite the
doctrine of parliamentary omnipotence born in the seventeenth-century
documents of constitutional rank. See generally BATAILLER, supra note 39; L.N. BROWN &
J. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 118-26 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
BROWN & GARNER].
43. See BROWN & GARNER, note 42 supra, at 22-26.
44. See Syndicat G~n~ral des Ing~nieurs-Conseils, [1959] Lebon 394 (Conseil d'Etat, 26
juin 1959), reprinted in English in A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM
279-83 (2d ed. 1977).
45. See P. WIGNY, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 196 (1952).
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struggle to control the crown. In practice, however, they find ways to
prevent even Parliament from violating basic rights, notably through
presumptions about legislative intent that turn out, in practice, to be
irrebuttable4 6
C The European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice was established at about the same
time as the Corte costituzionale and the Bundesverfassungsgericht,
originally as the court of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC)47 and since 1958 also as the court of the European Economic
Community (EEC)48 and the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom).4 9 In part, it was designed to operate on the same principle
of centralized review as the Italian and German courts: a judge in any
of the member states who considers an interpretation of Community
law to be necessary to the decision of a pending case may stay the pro-
ceedings until the Court of Justice rules on the point.5 0 A court from
which there is no further appeal must do so." Using the three treaties
as its basic constitutional documents and speaking mainly in prelimi-
nary rulings requested by national judges, the Court of Justice has
fashioned a body of case law that some have compared to that of the
Marshall Court."
Since the member states accept judicial review to widely varying ex-
tents in their national systems, they have had to face different sorts of
problems in assimilating the supervision of the Court of Justice. But
even if the principle of judicial review were accepted as fully as it is in
46. See, e.g., LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 69-77 (1979). Cf. Conseil d'Etat
17 fvr. 1950, Ministre de r'Agriculture c. Dame Lamotte, [1950] Lebon 110.
47. See articles 7, 31-45 of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 143.
48. See articles 4, 164-188 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, [1973] GR. BRIT. T.S. No. 1, Part II, and articles 3 and
4 of the annexed Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communi-
ties.
49. See articles 3, 136-160 of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169, and the annexed Convention mentioned in note
48 supra. The texts of these and other documents are available in English in an inexpensive
supplement to E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE: TEXT, CASES AND READINGS (1976) [main volume hereinaf-
ter cited as STEIN-HAY-WAELBROECK], and in each of the Community languages in fairly
expensive editions (1973, 1978) published by the Commission.
50. Article 177 (2), EEC treaty; article 150 (2), Euratom Treaty.
51. Article 177 (3), EEC treaty; article 150 (3), Euratom Treaty.
52. Eg, Feld & Slotnick, "Marshalling" the European Community Court.- A Comparatie
Study in Judicial Integration, 25 EMORY L.J. 317 (1976); Casper, The Emerging European
Constitution, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 72ND
ANNUAL MEETING 169 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Casper].
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the United States, the difficulties that would remain are suggested by
Reid v. Covert,53 in which the Supreme Court held that no interna-
tional treaty could validate an act of Congress contrary to the Bill of
Rights. 4 The Italian and German constitutional courts have expressed
a similar unwillingness to allow treaties and the decisions of a supra-
national court to override their constitutional protection of fundamen-
tal rights."
There is thus a more fundamental issue at stake, of which the ques-
tion of centralized or decentralized review is only a reflection. Can a
constitutional government set another system above itself and its con-
stitution? If so, how and to what extent, and has this happened in each
of the member states of the European Community? Even the answers
to these questions, furthermore, will not bring the theoretical and prac-
tical problems of conflicting European constitutions to an end, for both
the Community treaties and the European Convention on Human
Rights are asserted to have supra-constitutional status. This is one of
the bases for arguing that the Community should formally adhere to
the Convention, but until it does so, the second Simmentha? decision56
assures that conflict between Community law and the Convention is a
potential issue for every judge in every member state.
57
II. THE SIMMENTHAL CASE
Simmenthal S.p.A., an Italian company, imported some beef from
France into Italy in 1973. Under a 1970 law continuing a much older
system, the Italian authorities charged a fee of some $700 for veterinary
and public health inspection of the imported beef. Simmenthal chal-
lenged the law in an Italian court, asserting that it was equivalent to a
53. 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957). A stronger precedent was United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649 (1898), but doubt had been cast on its authority by overbroad reading of Mis-
souri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
54. This seems as good a place as any to indicate that I would now take a stronger posi-
tion on freedom of speech and association than I did in Schroth & Mueller, Racial Discrimi-
nation: The United States and the International Convention, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 171 (1975). I
would now say that the United States lacks the constitutional power to ratify and enforce
such a treaty without a reservation of the sort discussed in that article.
55. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle for Getreide
und Futtermittel, BVerfGE 37, S. 271 (1974), [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540; Sentenza 27 dicembre
1973, n.183 (Frontini c. Ministero delle Finanze), 97 FORO IT. 1 314 (1974), [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 372 (Corte Cost.). See Schroth, Federalism andAutomotive Pollution in Europe and
the United States, 56 J. URBAN L. 957, 1004-07 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schroth];
Jekewitz, Verfassungsbeschwerden wegen Verstosses auch gegen Gemeinschaftsrecht?,
EUROPARECHT 1978, 26.
56. See note I supra.
57. Cf. Hunnings, Rival Constitutional Courts. A Comment on Case 106/77, 15 COM.
MKT. L. REV. 483, 484 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hunnings].
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quantitative restriction and therefore barred under Article 30 of the
EEC treaty.58 The question was certified to the Court of Justice, which
held in Simmenthal I that such laws violate the treaty 59
The Italian judge accordingly ordered the Italian Finance Adminis-
tration to repay the fee with interest, but the government continued to
defend on the ground that under Italian law the Italian judge had no
power to disregard the statute. The point was not, however, that Italian
laws prevail over the treaty, but rather that only the Constitutional
Court can declare an Italian statute void. This rule must be explored
further before we return to Simmenthal 11.60
The Community treaties were ratified in Italy by ordinary statutes,
and in 1964 the Constitutional Court took the position that they could
have no higher rank than the act by which they became part of the
Italian legal order, and therefore were displaced by any subsequent in-
consistent statute.6' This was clearly too extravagant to maintain, and
since 197362 the Italian Court has held that the treaties are based on
article 11 of the constitution,63 and therefore outrank ordinary statutes.
While this means that statutes inconsistent with Community law may
be declared unconstitutional, it also permits the view that the guaran-
tees of fundamental rights in the Italian constitution can override in-
consistent Community law, at least within Italy.64
58. Article 30 provides: "Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having
equivalent effect shall. . . be prohibited between Member States."
59. Simmenthal S.p.A. v. Italian Minister of Finance, Case 35/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1871,
[1977] 2 C.M.L.R. I (Dec. 15, 1976).
60. See note 1 supra.
61. Sentenza 7 marzo 1964, n.14 (Costa c. E.n. el.), 87 FORo IT. I 465 (1964), [1964] 2
C.M.L.R. 425 (Corte cost.). The Court of Justice took a sharply different view the same year
in another aspect of the same case. Costa v. E.N.EL., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585. See
notes 96, 99 infra and accompanying text. After producing major decisions of these courts,
the $3.08 controversy was dismissed by the Court of Cassation for lack of standing. Costa c.
E.n. el., [1970] FORO IT. 1, 765.
62. Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze, supra note 55.
63. ITALIAN CONST. art. 11 reads as follows:
Italy renounces war as an instrument of offense against the liberty of other peoples
and as a means of resolving international disputes; she will agree, on conditions of
equality with other States, to the limitations of her sovereignty necessary to an organi-
zation for assuring peace and justice among nations; and will promote and favor inter-
national organizations constituted for this purpose.
Query, of course, whether the European Community is fairly described as an "organization
for assuring peace and justice among nations." See generally Sperduti, Sulle 'Limilazioni di
Sovranit&"secondo l'lriicolo 11 della Conslituzione, 1978 RivisTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO
PUBBLICO 473.
64. In Sentenza 27 dicembre 1973, n.183 (Frontini c. Ministero delle Finanze), 97 FORO
IT. I 314, 329 (1974), [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 372, 389, the Italian Constitutional Court said in
dictum:
It is hardly necessary to add that by Article II of the Constitution limitations of
sovereignty are allowed solely for the purpose- of the ends indicated therein, and it
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More importantly, since questions of conflicts between Community
law and Italian statutes have constitutional rank, they fall within the
Constitutional Court's monopoly on constitutional adjudication. In a
series of rulings beginning in 1975, the Court forbade lower courts to
disregard statutes that conflict with Community law, requiring them
instead to refer such questions to it as constitutional questions.6" This
has the obvious advantage of permitting a definitive ruling in a system
otherwise without stare decisis, although problems of delay remain.
66
But a 1976 order67 by the Italian Court made the delay much worse,
holding that only the Court of Justice could determine whether a con-
flict existed between national and Community law, and that the Consti-
tutional Court itself was not the sort of "court or tribunal" authorized
to refer a question to the Court of Justice under the treaties.68
The result was the astonishing spectacle of a seven-step procedure
for applying Community law in the face of inconsistent Italian statutes:
1) the ordinaryjudge finds the claim of the statute's inconsistency with
Community law, and therefore unconstitutionality, "not manifestly un-
founded," and refers it to the Constitutional Court; 2) the Constitu-
tional Court finds that its decision requires an interpretation of a
provision of Community law, which it is not authorized to undertake,
and therefore remands the case to the lower court; 3) the lower court
refers the question to the Court of Justice; 4) the Court of Justice holds
the statute inconsistent with Community law, and informs the Italian
judge of its conclusion; 5) the Italian judge reports this finding to the
Constitutional Court; 6) the Constitutional Court holds the statute
should therefore be excluded that such limitations of sovereignty, concretely set out in
the Rome Treaty, signed by countries whose systems are based on the principle of the
rule of law and guarantee the essential liberties of citizens, can nevertheless give the
organs of the EEC an unacceptable power to violate the fundamental principles of our
constitutional order or the inalienable rights of man. And it is obvious that if ever
Article 189 had to be given such an aberrant interpretation, in such a case the guarantee
would always be assured that this Court would control the continuing compatibility of
the Treaty with the above-mentioned fundamental principles.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht took a similar position in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fftr Getreide und Futtermittel, BVerfGE 37, S. 271 (1974),
[19741 2 C.M.L.R. 540.
65. See note 3 supra.
66. Advocate General Reischl told the Court of Justice that "the requisite proceedings are
complicated and expensive and frequently take up to three or four years." [1978] E.C.R. at
653. A related point is that in Italy, as in the United States, a declaration of unconstitution-
ality is not completely retroactive with respect to other cases. See CAPPELLETrI, supra note
8, at 88-96. This is the point of the Pretore's question (b), note 70 infra, which the Court of
Justice found it unnecessary to answer, although it was discussed by both parties and by the
Advocate General.
67. See note 3 supra.
68. Article 177, EEC treaty; article 150, Euratom treaty.
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void, with erga omnes effect, and informs the lower court of its conclu-
sion; and 7) the lower court can at last decide the case in accordance
with Community law.69
In 1977, the lower-court judge in the Simmenthal litigation, faced
with this bizarre procedure, chose to attack it in the Court of Justice by
certifying the following leading question:
(a) Since, in accordance with Article 189 of the EEC Treaty and the estab-
lished case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities,
directly applicable Community provisions must, notwithstanding any in-
ternal rule or practice whatsoever of the Member-States, have full, com-
plete and uniform effect in their legal systems in order to protect
subjective legal rights created in favour of individuals, is the scope of the
said provisions to be interpreted to the effect that any subsequent national
measures which conflict with those provisions must be forthwith disre-
garded without waiting until those measures have been eliminated by ac-
tion on the part of the national legislature concerned (repeal) or of other
constitutional authorities (declaration that they are unconstitutional) es-
pecially, in the case of the latter alternative, where, since the national law
continues to be fully effective pending such declaration, it is impossible to
apply the Community provisions and, in consequence, to ensure that they
are fully, completely and uniformly applied and to protect the legal rights
created in favour of individuals?
70
The Court of Justice responded carefully but firmly:
[17] [I]n accordance with the principle of the precedence of Community
law, the relationship between provisions of the Treaty and directly appli-
cable measures of the institutions on the one hand and the national law of
the Member-States on the other is such that those provisions and meas-
ures not only by their entry into force render automatically inapplicable
any conflicting provision of current national law but-in so far as they are
an integral part of, and take precedence in, the legal order applicable in
the territory of each of the Member-States-also preclude the valid adop-
tion of new national legislative measures to the extent to which they
would be incompatible with Community provisions. . . . [21] It follows
from the foregoing that every national court must, in a case within its
jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which
69. See also Pappalardo, supra note 3, at 164-65.
70. [1978] E.C.R. at 632, [19781 3 C.M.L.R. at 281. This was followed by an additional
question:
(b) Arising out of the previous question, in circumstances where Community law
recognises that the protection of subjective legal rights created as a result of "directly
applicable" Community provisions may be suspended until any conflicting national
measures are actually repealed by the competent national authorities, is such repeal in
all cases to have a wholly retroactive effect so as to avoid any adverse effects on those
subjective legal rights?
1d at 632-33, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 282.
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the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provi-
sion of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subse-
quent to the Community rule . .. [24] The first question should
therefore be answered to the effect that a national court which is called
upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Commu-
nity law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary
refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national
legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the
court to request or await the prior setting aside of such provision by legis-
lative or other constitutional means.
7 '
In November 1978, however, the Tribunale of Milan found the ques-
tion of another statute's unconstitutionality for conflict with the EEC
treaty "not manifestly unfounded," and referred it to the Constitutional
Court.72 By January 1980, the latter had not yet announced whether it
would accept or defy the Community Court's decision in Simmenthal
//.
The response to Simmenthal II among commentators has been gen-
eral approval outside Italy7 3-although estimations of its importance
vary widely-and mixed reviews, with many vehemently opposed to
the decision, in Italy.74 For the most part, the non-Italian commenta-
tors see the issue as the effectiveness and supremacy within its sphere of
Community law, while the Italians see it as decentralized versus cen-
tralized judicial review, and misguided outside interference in the
71. Id. at 643-44, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 283-84. The second question (quoted in note 70
supra) therefore did not have to be answered. Id at 645, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 284.
72. Ordinanza 16 novembre 1978 (S.p.A. Comavicola c. Amministrazione delle Finanze
delle Stato), reprinted in 15 RIvISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE
292 (1979).
73. See Barav, Les Effets du Droit Communautaire Directement Applicable, CAHIERS DE
DROIT EUROPtEN 265 (1978); Boulouis, Cour de Justice des Communaut~s Europeennes, Ac-
TUALITt JURIDIQUE (DROIT ADMINISTRATIF) 323 (Juin 1978); Dauses, Anmerkungen zu
Jangsten Entscheidungen des EuGH, JURISTENZEITUNrG 512 (1978); Hunnings, Rival Consti-
tutional Courts: .4 Comment on Case 106/77, 15 CoM. MKT. L. REV. 483 (1978); Ipsen, Die
Rolle des Prozessrichters in der Vorrang-Frage: Zur Bedeutung des I1 Simmenthal- Urteils
(Rs. 106/77) des Europilschen Gerichtshofs, EUROPARECHT 223 (1979); Note, Community
Law and the Sovereignty of Parliament: Once More With Feeling, 3 EUR. L. REV. 175 (1978);
Usher, The Primacy of Community Law, 3 EUR. L. REV. 214 (1978); van Dijk, Noot, S.E.W.
9/10 at 647 (1978).
74. CENTRO NAZIONALE DI PREVENZIONE E DIFESA SOCIALE, IL PRIMATO DEL DiRr-ro
COMUNITARIO E I GIUDICI ITALIANI (1978), collects 24 essays (counting the introduction) on
SimmenthalII, in addition to relevant documents and a bibliography. In addition, see Mig-
liazza, l1 Giudizio di Legittimitez Constituzionale e la Corte di Giustizia delle Comunit
Europee, 33 RiVISTA Di DIRI-ro PROCESSUALE 328 (1978). See also Sperduti, Diritto
Comunitario e Diritto Interno nella Giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale Italiana e delle
Corte di Giustizia delle Comuniti Europee: Un Dissidio da Sanare, 23 GUIRISPRUDENZA
COSTItUZIONALE I 791 (1978).
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workings of the Italian legal system. Perhaps the most telling point is
that Italy is also under fire from the Court of Justice for failing to re-
move from its books statutes inconsistent with Community law; merely
refraining from applying the inconsistent laws, the Court of Justice
holds, does not constitute compliance." Yet given Italy's hopelessly
ineffective parliament, systematic repeal can hardly be expected, and
SimmenthalI attacks the one really effective procedure, namely void-
ing by the Constitutional Court.
7 6
Italy presumably could respond with an abstract procedure for
bringing statutes inconsistent with Community law to the attention of
the Constitutional Court without staying or otherwise affecting ongoing
litigation. In particular, this would be much easier in Italy, where some
kinds of abstract questions are routinely presented to the Court, than in
a country like the United States, where a case or controversy is re-
quired.
The decision of the Court of Justice has a more subtle level, however,
based directly on earlier decisions of the German Constitutional
Court77 and the Belgian 78 and French79 Cours de cassation. All three
courts succeeded in upholding the supremacy of Community law, de-
spite their unwillingness to invalidate national statutes, by declaring
that national and Community law "applied" to different areas. When
Community law validly covers a point, that is, the apparently conflict-
ing national law is not void or invalid; it simply does not "apply." 80
75. Eg., Commission v. Italian Republic, Case 123/76, [1977] E.C.R. 1449.
76. Hunnings, supra note 57, at 487, adds:
The paradox is sharpened yet again by the fact that the Italian situation reflects that of
the Community almost exactly: in the Community, too, the legislative process is slow
and cumbersome, it is extremely difficult to repeal laws and the Court has taken on the
main burden of developing the law. What is sauce for the Community gander is cer-
tainly not sauce for the national goose!
77. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle for Ge-
treide und Futtermittel, BVerfGE 37, S. 271 (1974), [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540.
78. See Minister for Economic Affairs v. S.A. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse 'Le Ski', [1971]
J.T. 460, [1971] R.T.D.E. 494 [1972] C.M.L.R. 330 (May 27, 1971).
79. See Administration des Douanes c. Socint6 "Cafes Jacques Vabre" et S.A.R.L. J.
Weigel, [1975] D.S. Jur. 497, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 336.
80. This distinction might also be compared to article 184, EEC treaty, and article 156,
Euratom treaty. When the two-month period specified in article 173(3), EEC treaty, and
article 146(3), Euratom treaty, has expired, a provision may no longer be declared vold
under article 174, EEC treaty, and article 147, Euratom treaty. However, it may at any time
be declared inapplicable to aparticular party under article 184, EEC treaty, or article 156,
Euratom treaty.
A somewhat similar approach is used in Canada, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Lindal and Beat-
tie, [1934] 1 D.L.R. 497, 503:
The effect of this legislation by Parliament was to supersede existing provincial legisla-
tion, which was legislation in the same field; and thereafter, as long, at all events, as the
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This approach is carefully and consistently followed in paragraphs [21]
and [24] of SimmenthalI, although the point is masked in the English
translation by the unfortunate use of "must... set aside" for "disap-
plicando" in paragraph [21].
81
This technique, it has been suggested, could be used in Britain as a
way of complying with Community law while avoiding judicial review,
and it is even possible to find cases there in which it has been used.82
Even more attention is paid to Community encroachments on national
sovereignty in Britain than in Italy, as the long series of responses to
Simmenthal II in the letters columns of the London Times demon-
strated,83 and if such a solution could be made palatable it would be
most welcome. That it cannot happen without a conscious choice,
however, raises another level of problems, already suggested at the end
of Part I.
III. CHANGING THE GRUNDNORM
The Constitution of the United States is ordinarily treated as our
Grundnorm. Our awareness that something lies beyond the Constitu-
tion is shown by our fairly frequent references to the intent of the
Framers and of the state ratifying conventions; indeed, a few would
treat their intentions as immutable rules, at least until their successors
are consulted by similar procedures.8 4 If we ask whence the conven-
Dominion legislation should remain in force, the provincial legislation would necessar-
ily be inoperative. The Dominion legislation has remained in force until the present
day.
81. Paragraph [21] reads as follows in the original Italian:
dal complesso delle precedenti considerazioni risulta che qualsiasi giudice nazionale,
adito nell'ambito della sua competenza, ha l'obbligo di applicare integralmente il diritto
comunitario e di tutelare i diritti che questo attribuisce ai singoli, disapplicando le dis-
posizioni eventualmente contrastanti della legge interna, sia anteriore sia successiva alla
norma comunitaria ....
[1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 287-88 (emphasis added).
82. Hunnings, supra note 57, cites Re an Absence in Ireland, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 5.
83. See The Times (London), April 18, 1978, at 17, col. 7; 1d, April 20, 1978, at 19, col. 5;
id, April 21, 1978, at 19, col. 4; id, April 25, 1978, at 17, col. 6; id, April 27, 1978, at 19, col.
4; 1d, April 28, 1978, at 17, col. 7; id, April 29, 1978, at 17, col. 4; id, May 3, 1978, at 22, col.
4; id, May 6, 1978, at 17, col. 2; id, May 8, 1978, at 17, col. 5; id, May 9, 1978, at 19, col. 4;
id, May 11, 1978, at 15, col. 4; id, May 12, 1978, at 17, col. 1; 1d, May 17, 1978, at 17, col. 7;
id, May 22, 1978, at 15, col. 7.
84. E.g., BERGER, supra note 15; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)
(Taney, CJ.). See also L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 16-17 (1972):
The members of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, notwithstanding their enor-
mous respect for the great John Locke, ignored his example. Locke was a dreadfully
inept constitution maker. On the theory that written statements of fundamental law
must be immutable, like the laws of the universe, in order to be eternal, Locke framed
for Carolina a constitution expressly providing that "every part thereof, shall be and
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tions derived their authority, we may construct an infinite regress,"5
and for practical purposes some starting point must be taken as given.
86
One reason, a sufficient reason but not the only one, for selecting the
Constitution as our working Grundnorm is focus: the text is the one
thing we know the conventions all accepted.
Can the Grundnorm be changed, and if so, how? At one level, of
course, the Constitution, like most written constitutions, contains an
amendment procedure. Almost87 any provision can be changed or re-
placed by this procedure, and presumably it could be used to substitute
a completely new document.88
The only time in our history when we did substitute a new document,
however, we did so without even going through the motions of the
amendment procedure. In a sense, that is, the Articles of Confedera-
tion are still in effect, awaiting a change that can only be made by
unanimous consent of the state legislatures.89 Our agreement that this
remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of government for Carolina forever."
As insurance, he futilely added that "all manner of comments and expositions on any
part of these fundamental constitutions, or on any part of the common or statute laws of
Carolina, are absolutely prohibited." By contrast, the framers of the United States
Constitution recognized the inevitability of change and the need for plasticity. They
therefore provided for an orderly amendment procedure. They also provided for a
Supreme Court whose duties--"the judicial power shall extend to all cases ... arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties"-required it to
engage in "all manner of comments and expositions."
85. This point is not so trivial as it might appear. Consider that the electorate which
chose the members of the state ratifying conventions consisted exclusively of males, whites
only in most states, of a certain age, owning a certain amount of property, and so forth.
Surely we would not let such a group speak for all today; how then can its act of almost 200
years ago bind us now?
86. Cf KELSEN, supra note 10, at 98-99. Hofstadter's version of roughly the same point is
part of the "Little Harmonic Labyrinth," HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 103-26, with a more
(nearly) formal discussion at 127-52 and passim.
87. What about the last clause of U.S. CONST. art. V, which states that despite the provi-
sion for amendment, "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate"? Could that clause be amended? Should there be a clause forbidding amend-
ment of that clause? This begins to sound like Hofstadter's fantasies cited in note 86 supra.
See also note 84 supra.
88. See generally Symposium on the Article V Convention Process, 66 MIcH. L. REV. 837-
1016 (1968).
89. The second sentence of article XII reads:
And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state,
and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made
in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States
and be afterward confirmed by the legislatures of every state.
Madison, on the other hand, considered popular ratification
essential. "The articles of Confed. n themselves were defective in this respect, resting in
many of the States on the Legislative sanction only. Hence in conflicts between acts of
the States, and of Cong.s especially where the former are of posterior date, and the
decision is to be made by State tribunals, an uncertainty must necessarily prevail, or
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is a senseless sense shows our acceptance of the underlying authority of
the specially-elected conventions to replace one constitution with an-
other.
This acceptance, however, may not be unanimous even today, and
was far from being so before the Civil War. 'Jefferson, for example,
insisted in his defense of free speech that the Constitution was only an
agreement among the states:
Resolved, That the several states composing the United States of
America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their
general government; but that by compact, under the style and title of a
Constitution for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they con-
stituted a general government for special purposes, delegated to that gov-
ernment certain definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the
residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and that whenso-
ever the general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are un-
authoritative, void, and of no force: That to this compact each state
acceded as a State, and is an integral party, its co-states forming as to
itself, the other party.90  0
And Calhoun made the same point in his defense of the slave-based
Southern economy against tariffs favoring the industrial North:
The great and leading principle is, that the General Government ema-
nated from the people of the several States, forming distinct political com-
munities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not
from all of the people forming one aggregate political community; that
the Constitution of the United States is, in fact, a compact, to which each
State is a party .... 91
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, insisted that the Constitution
came from the people, not the states. Justice Story argued: "The Con-
stitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the
states in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of
rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of the State authority. He suggested also that
as far as the articles of Union were to be considered as a Treaty only of a particular sort,
among the Governments of Independent States, the doctrine might be set up that a
breach of any one article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from the
whole obligation. For these reasons as well as others he thought it indispensable that
the new Constitution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable form, and by the
supreme authority of the people themselves.".
J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 70 (G. Hunt & J.
Scott eds., Ohio U. Press reprint ed. 1966). Cf. C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 225-
33 (1966). See (very) generally KELSEN, supra note 10, at 248-54.
90. The quotation is from the First Kentucky Resolution, reprinted in THE VIRGINIA RE-
PORT OF 1799-1800, TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS; TOGETHER WITH THE VIR-
GINIA RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21, 1798, 162 (J. Randolph ed. 1850, reprinted 1970).
91. 6 J. CALHOUN, THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 59, 60 (Crall6 ed. 1859).
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the constitution declares 'by the people of the United States'. ' g And
Chief Justice Marshall later put it this way:
[B]y the convention, by Congress, and by the state legislatures, the
[Constitution] was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the
only manner in which they can act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such
a subject, by assembling in Convention. . . . From these conventions the
Constitution derives its whole authority. The government proceeds di-
rectly from the people. . . . The assent of the States, in their sovereign
capacity, is implied in calling a Convention, and thus submitting that in-
strument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or
reject it; and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and could
not be negatived, by the State governments. The Constitution, when thus
adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the State sovereignties.
93
But if we draw from this the principle that a shift in the working
Grundnorm can always be made by returning to the people speaking
through their representatives in conventions, we are immediately in dif-
ficulty. If the result of the Civil War is not merely a demonstration of
the superiority of the Northern armies, but rather perhaps an example
of the principle that once the people form a union only the people of
the whole union, not those merely of some part, can dissolve it, what of
Dorr's constitution in Rhode Island?94 More significantly for contem-
porary concerns in Europe and the United States, what of the judges'
rold in major shifts of the Grundnorm, as in the incorporation of the
Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, Reynolds v. Sims,95 or
the Court of Justice's insertion of a supremacy clause into the Euro-
pean Community treaties?96
Reference to the people as the repository of sovereignty on which
even the constitution is based is a difficult argument to make for the
European Community treaties. The Court of Justice nevertheless of-
92. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816).
93. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819).
94. A convention held without authority of the existing government in 1841 drafted a
"People's Constitution" which was ratified by a large majority. In 1842, an election was
held under this constitution, the people choosing Thomas W. Dorr as governor. The old
government refused to yield, however, and President Taylor supported it. The United States
Supreme Court refused to get involved, inventing the excuse of "political questions." Luther
v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See also, Expare Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
See generally P. COLEMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF RHODE ISLAND 1790-1860, 274-94
(1963); A. MOWRY, THE DORR WAR (1901; reprinted 1970). It might be added that the
principle mentioned in the text casts doubt on the legitimacy of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, as would the Dorr's Rebellion gloss that only the existing government may initiate
the process of replacing the constitution.
95. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (one person, one vote in drawing districts for both houses of state
legislatures).
96. Costa v. E.N.EL., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585. See note 99 infra.
[Vol. 12
MARBURYAND SIMMENTHAL
fered it in van Gend & Loos, asserting that the Community treaties'
special status, distinct from ordinary international treaties, was "con-
firmed by the preamble. . . which refers not only to governments but
to peoples." 97 Probably the best that could be said for this is that refer-
enda were held in some of the member states-to-be, and that their non-
meaninglessness is suggested by Norway's failure to ratify after a ma-
jority voted against.98 But this approach is so obviously vulnerable
even to the Italian Constitutional Court's former line that the treaties
were ratified by ordinary statutes that the Court of Justice took only
one year to move from the positivist argument of delegation from the
people to a claim of Community supremacy based on the nature of
things.99
The supremacy of the Community treaties over the Italian Constitu-
tion and the simultaneous supremacy of the constitution over the trea-
ties is reminiscent of M.C. Escher's Drawing Hands, a 1948 lithograph
in which the right hand draws the left while the left draws the right.' 0
Douglas R. Hofstadter has already noted the analogy in law:
But what happens when there is no higher court, and the Supreme
Court itself gets all tangled up in legal troubles? This sort of snarl nearly
happened in the Watergate era. The President threatened to obey only a
"definitive ruling" of the Supreme Court-then claimed he had the right
to decide what is "definitive." Now that threat never was made good; but
if it had been, it would have touched off a monumental confrontation
between two levels of government, each of which, in some ways, can val-
idly claim to be "above" the other-and to whom is there recourse to
decide which one is right? To say "Congress" is not to settle the matter,
for Congress might command the President to obey the Supreme Court,
97. N.V. Allegemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nether-
lands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 23.
98. For Denmark, however, the point is a good one, since the referendum was an essential
part of the procedure chosen for ratification, even though a non-referendum alternative was
constitutionally permissible. See note 34 supra.
99. Costa v. E.N.EL., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585. Cf. Casper, supra note 52, at 171.
See generally Hay & Thompson, The Community Court and Supremacy of Community Law.-
4 Progress Report, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 651 (1975).
100. One of the many places this has been reproduced is HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at
690. A larger and clearer reproduction appears as plate 69 in M.C. ESCHER, THE GRAPHIC
WORK OF M.C. ESCHER (J. Brigham trans. rev. ed. 1967), where it is described by the artist
as follows:
A piece of paper is fixed to a base with drawing pins. A right hand is busy sketching a
shirt-cuff upon this drawing paper. At this point its work is incomplete but a little
further to the right it has already drawn a left hand emerging from a sleeve in such
detail that this hand has come right up out of the flat surface, and in its turn it is
sketching the cuff from which the right hand is emerging, as though it were a living
member.
Id at 15.
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yet the President might still refuse, claiming that he has the legal right to
disobey the Supreme Court (and Congress!) under certain circumstances.
This would create a new court case, and would throw the whole system
into disarray, because it would be so unexpected, so Tangled-so Strange!
The irony is that once you hit your head against the ceiling like this,
where you are prevented from jumping out of the system to a yet higher
authority, the only recourse is to forces which seem less well defined by
rules, but which are the only source of higher-level rules, which in this
case means the general reaction of society. It is well to remember that in
a society like ours, the legal system is, in a sense, a polite gesture granted
collectively by millions of people-and it can be overridden just as easily
as a river can overflow its banks. Then a seeming anarchy takes over; but
anarchy has its own kinds of rules, no less than does civilized society: it is
just that they operate from the bottom up, not from the top down.'
0 '
At first glance, this resembles the point already made about the deeper
Grundnorm, and the first level of analysis seems unexceptionable. This
is Marbury too, of course, and there the Supreme Court cleverly
avoided a confrontation. President Nixon backed down, leaving the
Supreme Court supreme, 02 and probably the Italian Constitutional
Court will do the same.1
0 3
On closer inspection, however, Hofstadter's political world mirrors
reality about as faithfully as Escher's physical world. The world of
American politics is not merely the sum of the individual actions of
millions of people, and the next level of response when the pre-estab-
lished rules offer no obvious solution to a conflict is not usually anar-
chy. Hofstadter's religious reductionism-determinism may be the most
functional adaptation for a computer scientist with an interest in artifi-
cial intelligence, though at least for me his own book casts some doubt
on the point."° It leads him astray, however, on questions of law and
government, for courts and judges (and presidents) do not behave like
atomic particles, at least in any way open to human observation. Hof-
stadter here violates his own rule about not generalizing the conclu-
sions of mathematics, based on rigorous definitions, to fields with less
101. Id at 692-693. "Tangled" and "Strange" are terms of art, defined as follows at 10:
"The 'Strange Loop' phenomenon occurs whenever, by moving upwards (or downwards)
through the levels of some hierarchical system, we unexpectedly find ourselves right back
where we started .... Sometimes I use the term Tangled Hierarchy to describe a system in
which a Strange Loop occurs."
102. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), vaguely asserting the relevance of
Marbury. See also Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy. The Nixon Case
and the Impeachment Process, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 30 (1974).
103. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
104. See "Prelude..." HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 275-84; "... Ant Fugue," id at
311-36.
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certain bases, 105 and comes to a fallacious conclusion.
Stated otherwise, human institutions do not hold still long enough to
be destroyed by Gbdel's proof"16 If "strange loops" occur in govern-
ment, they do not survive, because human institutions perceive them as
states of disequilibrium, requiring further proceedings. In conflict of
laws, courts simply accept the renvol; in the less-civilized world of poli-
tics the more powerful of two claimants to supremacy forces the other
to yield. At a deeper level, whether or not there is a Political Question
That Cannot Be Resolved in Political System X 107 is not the important
issue; we all live with the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. The impor-
tant issue is how to make a political system serve society's needs and
desires in the real world, a question both less impregnable and vastly
more complex.
IV. SPECIALIZED JUDGES AND GENERALIZED JUDGES
The more practical basic question raised by Marbury and Sim-
menthal II is the role of judges in developing the law. Opponents of
judicial activism generally turn out to be opponents of the policies of
particular judges rather than opponents of activism in all contexts; the
corresponding comment could be made about proponents. 08 I will not
claim to be an exception; on the contrary, I think a version of result
orientation is preferable to a choice either for or against activism re-
gardless of the results. The difference between the Warren Court's "ac-
tivism" and that of some of its predecessors is that most of the laws and
practices attacked in the 1950's and 1960's were the unjust vestiges of
an earlier, less enlightened era, rather than needed, modern reform
measures. 109
105. HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 696.
106. Alternatively, without denying the relevance of Godel it could be argued that at least
part of the legal system's justification comes from outside the legal system. Cf. E. NAGEL &
J. NEWMAN, GODEL'S PROOF 98-102 (1958).
107. The reference is to the "Contracrostipunctus," HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 75-81.
108. Raoul Berger, however, asserts his own purity in BERGER, supra note 15, at 4. In-
deed, his very title seems to be a pointed reference to L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICI-
ARY (1932).
109. Cf Tribe, Toward a Model of/Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1973):
Unlike the aim of the Court in the Lochner era-to spin out the theorems of a moral
and economic geometry from postulates rooted in the unalterable nature of the world-
the aim I would urge upon the judiciary is considerably more modest: to participate,
with sensitivity to its own role and its limits, in the ongoing social process of structuring
the roles of others in accord with the contemporary significance of our collective past,
called the Constitution. One can only hope that the legal profession, which put sub-
stantive due process on the misdirected track it rode for nearly fifty years before derail-
ing at the West Coast Hotel in 1937, is now sufficiently independent of any particular
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In particular, I do not think that a question of such practical signifi-
cance as the proper judicial role should be decided on the basis of ab-
stract logic, or of the imagined intentions of the great men of earlier
centuries. Neither should we deprive ourselves of a level of response
by choosing activism or restraint case by case. Rather the sort of com-
parative study reflected in this comment strongly suggests that respon-
sibility for constitutional development should be allocated according to
our perception of the qualifications and abilities of the candidates., 10
In limiting constitutional review to specially qualified judges, that is,
the Germans and Italians are at least asking the right question. If the
Pretore of Susa, who posed the questions in SimmenthaHII, is typical of
lower-court judges in Europe, then perhaps the Court of Justice has hit
on the right answer even without addressing the question.
On the other hand, the decision does not so much empower lower
court judges-since there is no stare decisis in most member states-as
reduce the power of the Court of Justice's national rivals, especially the
Constitutional Courts of Italy and West Germany. By the standard of
demonstrated ability the Court of Justice is certainly worthy, but it is
not so clear that the Constitutional Courts are not. The real point is
that the issue is not being discussed in terms either of the judges' ex-
isting qualifications ye! non or of means for assuring that those who
perform this role are well qualified.
In certain ways, the civil-law tradition's greater division of judicial
labor represents a more advanced step toward solution of modern
problems than our own. Litigation, in Europe as in the United States,
is increasingly concerned with constitutional and legislative policy,
public rights and control of expanding bureaucracies. In the civil-law
countries, these are considered matters quite separate from the private
disputes handled by ordinary courts. From another perspective, mod-
em complex litigation of public-law issues requires a more active judge
than has been traditional in the common law. An argument could per-
haps be constructed that the ordinary judges of the civil-law tradition
are better qualified, by training and experience, for this active role than
their American counterparts." I
group in the "established order" to facilitate the transition I envision from a retrogres-
sive and autocratic version of due process to a conception more consistent with human
progress.
Id. at 52-53. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
110. Could it be that the rule of stare decisis tends to accomplish this by binding ordinary
judges while leaving those who are especially creative-say, Benjamin Cardozo-unre-
strained?
I 11. This may be the point intended by Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
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Whether or not different competences are called for in public and
private, in ordinary and constitutional, in national and supra-national,
or in simple and complex litigation, and whether or not it is difficult or
even unwise to combine these competences in the same judge, at least
the question is the right one: how can we best assure that these matters
will tend to be handled in the most appropriate and effective manner?
By taking judges out of the picture entirely? By assigning certain kinds
of cases only to specially qualified judges? By providing training in
these areas also as part of the common education of judges?
An increasingly complex legal world, at all levels, makes it clear at
least that simple-minded ideas of separation of powers, in the manner
of Montesquieu, are useless. The modem problem of government is
not so much runaway executives, legislatures or judges as runaway ad-
ministrators. Abolishing the administrative branch is not a realistic op-
tion; nor is placing it under the strict control of another branch. The
task, rather, is to guide it, to structure its endeavors, to restrict its ex-
cesses.
While the problem of administration grows, the classical problem of
coordinating legislative bodies in a federal system has never faded
away. The point here is that there is no need to presume that judicial
review whose purpose is control of the bureaucracy and judicial review
whose purpose is coordination of several legislatures need to be as-
signed to the same courts, although they are in such systems as the
United States and European Community. Indeed, our experience in
the United States is that the Supreme Court is much more at home in
constitutional law than in some other fields, while some of the lower
courts are better than the Supreme Court in other areas. At least the
current Supreme Court shows a distressing ineptitude for some areas of
administrative law, for example, as contrasted with the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit." 2 This may be due to the latter's vastly greater experi-
ence with the problem area, but the conclusion that more specialized
courts are needed is probably not justified." 3 In particular, there are
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1298 (1976): "We may not yet have reached the investi-
gative judge of the continental systems, [citing Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1443 (1958)] but we have left the passive
arbiter of the traditional [common-law] model a long way behind." See generally FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed. 1973); FUNDAMENTAL
GUARANTEES, supra note 8, at 720-21.
112. See Schroth & Berning-Kopel, NEPA andthe Supreme Court, forthcoming in 9 ABA
INCL BRIEF, No. 2, at 6 (Feb. 1980). See also Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee:
Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699 (1979).
113. See S. 677, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 1 agree with the response of the Council on
Environmental Quality, 9 ENvIR. REP. 1169 (Current BNA Oct. 20, 1978).
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real advantages to the use of judges who are entirely innocent of the
particular issue, but expert decisionmakers." 14
In a decentralized system such as that of the United States, the ques-
tion is even more acute. Clearly if all judges are entrusted with consti-
tutional questions, all judges ought to be capable of understanding and
dealing with such questions. We are speaking, therefore, of matters of
degree: judges whose work emphasizes a particular area ought to be
particularly qualified for it, but no American judge can properly be
incompetent in areas like constitutional policy.
The judges may also be compared with the legislatures as agents of
reform and control. There is no doubt that in Italy and at the Commu-
nity level the judges are much better qualified and more effective than
the legislative bodies, playing a leading role almost by default. At the
national level, unlike the Community level, the system has the luxury
of differentiating various types of judges sufficiently to make the ad-
vantage even greater. This remains true despite Simmenthal II, and
indeed one way of seeing that case might be as transferring issues of
Community law to the courts that handle day-to-day business, where
they will be understood and developed in a more practical way. If the
decision is seen that way, the result may be comparable to the shift of
aspects of administrative law from the Supreme Court toward the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit that I and others have called desirable.II5
On the other hand, European Community law is to some extent con-
stitutional law, I 6 and it is therefore important to consider the qualifi-
cations of the judges to whom it is assigned for constitutional
decisionmaking. In the United States, we rarely discuss the qualifica-
tions for constitutional decision-making of judges other than Supreme
Court Justices. But even our discussion of Supreme Court appoint-
ments too often fails to reach the real issues.
The natural inclination of Presidents to appoint justices of their own
political philosophies--or at least to attempt to do sol7-is not alto-
gether a bad thing. It does make it more likely that the nominees are
persons who have thought about political and policy questions, and it
gives some influence, albeit indirect, to trends in the thinking of the
114. See generally J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION (1971); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
115. See note 112 supra.
116. Cf. Schroth, note 55 supra.
117. The point is not only that a President Nixon may have failed to win Senate confir-
mation for Judges Haynsworth and Carswell, but that a President Eisenhower may have
been surprised at the political philosophy of Chief Justice Warren.
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national electoral majority. Once we recognize, however, that not only
these but other factors are significant to the functioning of the Court,
and ofthe lower courts, as constitutional policy-making bodies, perhaps
we should consider institutionalizing some of them. The process em-
ployed over the last 190 years gives great weight to political and philo-
sophical agreement with the President, geography and, more recently,
religion and perhaps race; Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon and Ford
considered prior judicial experience important."l 8 Except for judicial
experience, which is almost irrelevant, these are secondary matters. My
own view is close to that of Judge Learned Hand:
"I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to pass
on a question of constitutional law, to have a bowing acquaintance with
Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon, and Carlyle, with Homer,
Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne, and
Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume, and Kant as with books that have
been specifically written on the subject .... They must be aware that
there are before them more than verbal problems; more than final solu-
tions cast in generalizations of universal applicability. They must be
aware of the changing social tensions in every society which make it an
organism; which demand new schemata of adaptation; which will disrupt
it, if rigidly confined."' 19
So it is a question of legal education, and of the relationship between
legal education and liberal education, between education in law school
and education that continues through life. Lawyers in America are an
elite to which we grant enormous power in diverse aspects of society, a
power we can ill afford to confer on over-specialized technicians.
Nor, however, can we afford to forego the advantages of relative spe-
cialization, including the difference between the role of the judicial
branch in constitutional policy-making and the roles of other branches,
and the difference between the role of the Supreme Court and those of
other courts. The judicial contribution, speaking generally, is the less
concerned with daily politics (though not altogether unconcerned) and
the more concerned with permanent values (though few if any of the
values are really eternal).
Judicial review is not essential to democracy. The point that legisla-
tors who know they have to take on themselves the final responsibility
will tend to act more responsibly has some validity, even if it is not
wholly convincing. Possibly some of the small countries can continue
to decline the advantages and consequent costs of judicial review: an-
118. See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS (1974); J. SIMON, IN HIS OWN
IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD NIXON'S AMERICA (1973).
119. Quoted in H. ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 44-48.
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other way of structuring the results of the inquiry at the end of Part I is
to note that the four largest member states have the most judicial re-
view, and the United States, bigger than any of them, has the most of
all. But the more advanced issue is the manner of sharing judicial re-
view so as to maximize its constructive influence on the various
branches while minimizing or avoiding harmful effects.
It is probably unnecessary, and perhaps futile, to discuss the proper
allocation of responsibility in such global terms. Perceived deficiencies
of an on-going system can be corrected by limited reforms, which are
much less likely to bring with them unforeseen serious adverse conse-
quences. At least the nature of the problem must be understood, how-
ever, or even the small reforms may do more harm than good. It was
understood in Marbury, a case which, despite its trivial controversy and
timid non-holding, became a world-renowned classic. If it was under-
stood in Simmenthal II, it was never expressed, and I suppose that the
decision will be remembered for the small contribution to an already
developed theory of the supremacy of Community law that appears in
the Court's opinion, rather than for the important and subtle issue of
judicial roles that lies just beneath the surface.
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